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INTRODUCTION
There is, happily, no shortage of scholarship offering detailed
analysis of the higher courts' jurisprudence on the crucial legal
questions of the day.' We are also lucky to live in a day and age
with a large and growing body of exhaustive, statistical literature
examining the day-to-day work of the lower courts. 2
Unfortunately, law reviews rarely contain articles that fill the gap
between these two approaches. 3 That is, there are few, if any,
meticulous discussions of the lower courts' decisions on routine
types of cases.4 This is a shame, for such cases are the ones that
most deeply affect the largest number of Americans.5  Without
1. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Losing Faith: The Supreme Court and
the Abandonment of the Adjudicatory Process, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1129 (2009).
2. See, e.g., Frank S. Bloch, Jeffrey S. Lubbers & Paul R. Verkuil,
Developing a Full and Fair Evidentiary Record in a Nonadversary Setting:
Two Proposals for Improving Social Security Disability Adjudications, 25
CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2003).
3. Indeed, that gap is starkly illustrated by the fact that of the forty-
seven cases that constitute the empirical sample analyzed by the article, see
infra Table I, only five have been mentioned in law review articles, two of
which are the only two published cases in the sample. See Jeffrey Bellin &
Junichi P. Semitsu, Widening Batson's Net to Ensnare More than the
Unapologetically Bigoted or Painfully Unimaginative Attorney, 96 CORNELL L.
REV. 1075, 1093 n.87, 1095 n.101 & 103 (2011) (citing Elder v. Berghuis, 644
F. Supp. 2d 888 (W.D. Mich. 2009); Hayes v. Quarterman, No. 05-1974, 2007
WL 4440951 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2007)); Caren Myers Morrison, Jury 2.0, 62
HASTINGS L.J. 1579, 1587 n.38 (2011) (citing Rucker v. Patrick, No. 08cv0364-
IEG (RBB), 2008 WL 4104230 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2008)); Parker B. Potter, Jr.,
Antipodal Invective: A Field Guide to Kangaroos in American Courtrooms, 39
AKRON L. REV. 73, 88 n.68 (2006) (citing Tunstall v. Hopkins, 126 F. Supp. 2d
1196 (N.D. Iowa 2000)); Dru Stevenson, The Function of Uncertainty Within
Jury Systems, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 513, 544 n.175 (2012) (citing Rhodes v.
Varano, No. 08-3236, 2009 WL 805506 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 26, 2009)).
4. See Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH.
L. REV. 946, 966 (2002) ("[Tlhe literature on race and the Fourth Amendment
has not fully examined the ways in which current doctrine affects the
everyday lives of people of color."); Katharina Heyer, A Disability Lens on
Sociolegal Research: Reading Rights of Inclusion from a Disability Studies
Perspective, 32 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 261, 267 (2007) (noting the lack of legal
scholarship on the impact of disability rights on "ordinary" people with
disabilities); Mark D. West, Losers: Recovering Lost Property in Japan and
the United States, 37 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 369, 370 (2003) ("While much legal
scholarship examines high-stakes issues, little focuses on lower-stakes,
everyday concerns that resonate with the life experiences of ordinary
people.").
5. See generally supra note 4.
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sustained, scholarly exploration of the lower courts' everyday
work-product, there will be large holes in the academy's
understanding of the judiciary and its role in modern society. And
without that understanding, serious proposals for reforming the
courts will suffer.
This article begins filling that gap. It does so by addressing
an extremely narrow question, but one with far-reaching
implications for our picture of judges and their role in American
life. The narrow question is this: what happens when a federal
district court judge rejects a federal magistrate judge's 6
recommendation to grant habeas relief and then rules on a
certificate of appealability (COA)? As with many judicial decisions
themselves, this highly specific question implicates a host of more
general concerns. Most importantly, can we trust judges to
consistently and effectively evaluate the quality and certainty of
their own decisions? In other words, can we trust judges to judge
themselves?
The answer presented here is a resounding no. Judges are
human, and however true their intentions are, they are simply
incapable of judging their own decisions in any meaningful way.
The futility of self-judging is presented in the starkest possible
terms by the context at issue in this article. When district judges
decline to issue a COA on a habeas petition that a magistrate
recommends grqnting, as we will see they routinely do,7 they say,
in effect, "I am so utterly confident in my ruling that I do not
believe the magistrate, who I appointed and who I rely upon on a
daily basis, is a reasonable jurist." The district judge says further,
"I have such unshakeable faith in my own ruling that I do not
believe any higher court should bother reconsidering my
conclusions." It is difficult to imagine a more striking reminder of
why judges are rarely permitted to be their own appellate review,
and a more striking illustration of why they should not be given
that authority with respect to COAs.
There are two lessons to take from the article's conclusion, a
6. In the interest of simplicity, federal district court judges will
henceforth be referred to as "district judges" and federal magistrate judges as
"magistrates."
7. See infra Table I.
8. See, e.g., In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) ("[N]o man can be
a judge in his own case").
CERTIFIABLE
straightforward and highly specific policy lesson, and a subtler
lesson that goes to the very heart of our judicial system. First,
federal district courts should not be allowed to deny COAs for
petitions after ruling on them on the merits. There should either
be no such thing as a COA, or circuit courts and the United States
Supreme Court should be the sole tribunals with the power to
issue them. Second, we need to think seriously about eliminating
self-judging elsewhere in the judicial system in light of this
indisputable evidence of its wrongheadedness.
The article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a general
overview of COAs to contextualize the discussion that follows,
explaining how they function and how they evolved historically.
Part II critiques, in logical and pragmatic terms, the practice of
allowing or requiring district judges to rule on COAs. Part III
bolsters that critique with the empirical case against the practice.
The article concludes with proposals for future research on this
subject and for more scholarship aligned with its novel
methodology.
I. GENERAL CONTEXT FOR COAs
We begin with a brief overview of how COAs work and how
they came to assume their current form in order to provide some
context for the rest of the article.
A. How COAs Work
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, an inmate in state custody is
entitled to a writ of habeas corpus if he is being held in violation of
his federal rights.9 When a federal court issues the writ, it
typically voids the challenged conviction and orders the state to
release the petitioner within a certain period of time or retry him
on the charges.' 0 Section 2254 petitions make up a substantial
9. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2006) ('The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a
circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of
habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a
State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.").
10. See, e.g., Moore v. Haviland, 476 F. Supp. 2d 768, 778 (N.D. Ohio
2007), aff'd, 531 F.3d 393 (6th Cir. 2008). Some § 2254 petitions challenge
state prison disciplinary proceedings. In such cases, if courts find the claim
meritorious, they will ordinarily vacate the disciplinary conviction and order
2012] 699
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portion of the federal judicial docket." Because most petitions are
meritless, 12 because most federal courts are loath to interfere
aggressively with state criminal justice systems, 3 and because
Congress and the Supreme Court have made it increasingly
difficult to obtain federal habeas relief by imposing a series of
procedural and substantive hurdles,14 § 2254 petitions are very
seldom granted.' 5
A § 2254 petitioner is entitled to appeal the denial of the writ
only if he is granted a COA.16 The COA, if granted, specifies the
particular issues that can be appealed.' 7 Either a district court or
a circuit court can issue the certificate, 8 but the district court is
required to rule on the COA in the first instance when it denies
habeas relief.19 If the district court denies the certificate, the
any other relief appropriate under the circumstances. See, e.g., Giano v.
Sullivan, 709 F. Supp. 1209, 1218 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
11. Nancy J. King, Fred L. Cheesman II & Brian J. Ostrom, FINAL
TECHNICAL REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT
COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF HABEAS CORPUS CASES FILED
BY STATE PRISONERS UNDER THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE
DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996, at 1 (2007) (calculating that each year
more than 18,000 cases are filed by state prisoners seeking § 2254 habeas
corpus relief, constituting one out of every fourteen civil cases filed in federal
district courts).
12. See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral
Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 148-49 (1970)
(deeming meritless habeas petitions "the most serious single evil" of
collateral attacks on convictions).
13. See, e.g., Ex parte Haumesch, 82 F.2d 558, 559 (9th Cir. 1936)
("Federal judges are reluctant to interfere with the orderly process of the
state courts, and should not do so by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
unless a substantial case is presented by the petitioner.").
14. See, e.g., Phelps v. Alameida, 569 F.3d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 2009)
("Given the trend these last decades on the part of Congress and the Supreme
Court increasingly to bar the federal courthouse door to litigants with
substantial federal claims, habeas petitioners-including petitioners who
may have suffered severe deprivations of their constitutional rights-now
face myriad procedural hurdles specifically designed to restrict their access to
the once-Great Writ." (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
15. See Amanda Frost & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Countering the
Majoritarian Difficulty, 96 VA. L. REV. 719, 778 n.183 (2010) (noting that .29%
of habeas petitioners received relief in a sample of noncapital cases).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2006).
17. Id. § 2253(c)(3).
18. See cases cited infra notes 59, 60, and 62.
19. RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2254 CASES IN THE U.S. DIST. CTs., R.
11(a) (2010) ("The district court must issue or deny a [COA] when it enters a
final order adverse to the applicant.") [hereinafter Rule 11(a)].
CERTIFIABLE
petitioner may seek one from the circuit court.20 Most important
for purposes of this article is the standard that courts are required
to bring to bear on motions for COAs. When a petition has been
denied on the merits, the Supreme Court has held, a COA must be
granted where "reasonable jurists would find the district court's
assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong."21
Where a petition has been denied on procedural grounds, by
contrast, the certificate issues if "jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of
a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural
ruling."22 Because this article is concerned only with cases in
which magistrates recommended granting habeas relief (and
therefore implicitly found no fatal procedural defects), the
distinction between the two standards is irrelevant for present
purposes. The simple proposition that undergirds the entire
article is that a COA should be granted where a reasonable jurist
would disagree with the district judge's disposition of the petition.
B. The History of Appealability in Habeas Law
To fully register the import of the findings presented here, it
is essential to have a general understanding of how appellate
procedures in habeas law have evolved to the present day.
1. The COA's Predecessors
The general right to a direct appeal from the initial tribunal
that hears a dispute is a bedrock principle in the American
judicial system and its forbears. 23 This is an important point to
keep in mind throughout the article, as everything discussed
below is essentially an exception to that general rule.
Turning to the unique context of appeals in habeas law, the
Supreme Court has intimated that there may be a constitutional
20. FED R. APp.P. 22(b)(1).
21. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175 (1803)
(affirming necessity of appellate review as a force that "revises and corrects
the proceedings in a case already instituted. . . ."). See generally Harlon
Leigh Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE
L.J. 62 (1985).
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right to habeas corpus relief,24 but has definitively held that there
is no constitutional right to appeal the denial of such relief.25
Freed from the constraints of any constitutional prohibition,
Congress has used restrictions on habeas appeals to regulate the
flow of habeas petitions through the federal courts. 26 The COA as
it stands today is the product of that history.
For present purposes, the historical narrative begins in 1867
with the passage of the Habeas Corpus Act. That Act placed no
limitations on the appeal of denied habeas petitions. 27 However,
because of worry that prisoners were deliberately abusing their
rights of appeal to stay executions (which automatically occurred
while appeals were pending), Congress mandated, in 1908, that
habeas petitioners be granted a certificate of probable cause (CPC)
in order to proceed on their petitions after denial by the trial
court.28 Congress added the CPC requirement because of delays
in state capital cases caused by perceived "frivolous" appeals in
federal habeas proceedings. 29 The Committee of the Judiciary of
the House of Representatives viewed the bill as a means "to
correct a very vicious practice of delaying the execution of
criminals by groundless habeas corpus proceedings and appeals
therein taken just before the day set for execution. . . ."30 With
respect to this article, there are two important elements to the
CPC, both of which, more or less, carried over into its successor,
the COA.
First is the standard for its issuance. In the absence of
24. See Exparte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 95-96 (1868) ("The terms of
[the Suspension Clause] necessarily imply judicial action" on habeas
petitions).
25. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335 (2003) ("As mandated by
federal statute, a state prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no
absolute entitlement to appeal a district court's denial of his petition.").
26. For a good general overview of this history, see Christopher Q.
Cutler, Friendly Habeas Reform-Reconsidering a District Court's Threshold
Role in the Appellate Habeas Process, 43 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 281, 283-309
(2007). See also Ira P. Robbins, The Habeas Corpus Certificate of Probable
Cause, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 307, 313-15 (1983); Ryan Hagglund, Comment,
Review and Vacatur of Certificates of Appealability Issued After the Denial of
Habeas Corpus Petitions, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 989, 994-98 (2005).
27. Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385 (1867).
28. Act of March 10, 1908, ch. 76, 35 Stat. 40 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253 (2006)).
29. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 892 (1983).
30. H.R. REP. No. 23, at 1 (1908).
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Supreme Court guidance for roughly seventy-five years, the
circuits differed slightly in their formulations of the appropriate
standard for issuing the CPC.31 Some appellate courts thought a
certificate was warranted "if it appeared from the petition itself
that appellant (petitioner) was not entitled to" habeas relief,32
others that certification was proper where "the petition [was] not
frivolous and that it present[ed] some question deserving
appellate review,"33 and still others that a "substantial
constitutional question" must have been presented to merit a
CPC. 34 The Supreme Court eventually resolved the inconsistency,
arriving at the same standard it later applied to COAs: "that the
issues are debatable among jurists of reason; that a court could
resolve the issues (in a different manner); or that the questions
are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further."35
Additionally, like the COA, the CPC could be granted by a district
court, and like the COA, the practice was encouraged by the
federal appellate courts. 36
2. The Emergence of the COA
Federal habeas law underwent major renovation in 1996.
That year, Congress, with broad bipartisan support, 37 and in
response to the Oklahoma City bombing, 38 passed the
31. See generally Harry A. Blackmun, Allowance of In Forma Pauperis
Appeals in § 2255 and Habeas Corpus Cases, 43 F.R.D. 343, 352 (1967)
(collecting cases).
32. In re Mooney, 72 F.2d 503, 505 (9th Cir. 1934) (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
33. Alexander v. Harris, 595 F.2d 87, 89-91 (2d Cir. 1979).
34. Player v. Steiner, 292 F.2d 1, 2 (4th Cir. 1961).
35. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 (1983) (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted). (articulating standard for CPCs); see also
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003) (applying Barefoot standard to
COAs).
36. See Nowakowski v. Maroney, 386 U.S. 542, 543 (1967); Gardner v.
Pogue, 558 F.2d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 1977); Flint v. Howard, 464 F.2d 1084,
1086 n.* (1st Cir. 1972) (per curiam); Taylor v. Swenson, 458 F.2d 593, 595
(8th Cir. 1972).
37. AEDPA passed 91-8 in the United States Senate, 140 CONG. REc. S7,
858 (1995), and 293-133 in the House of Representatives, 140 CONG. REC. H3,
618 (1996).
38. See 142 CONG. REC. H3614 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1996) (statement of
Rep. Pelosi) (acknowledging the Oklahoma City bombing as the impetus for
AEDPA).
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Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), a law
that imposed significant procedural hurdles on federal habeas
petitioners. 39  For present purposes, the important novelty
introduced by AEDPA was the COA. Under AEDPA, "unless a
circuit justice 40 or judge issues a [COA], an appeal may not be
taken to the court of appeals . . . ."4 1 The statute further provides
that a COA may only issue when "the applicant has made a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right."42
Finally, the statute requires that that the COA indicate "which
specific issue or issues satisfy" the standard.43
The standard that applied to the issuance of the COA was the
same as the standard the Supreme Court (belatedly) required for
the issuance of the CPC: whether reasonable jurists could debate
the result.44 This continuity resulted not so much from anything
inherent in the statutory bases for either the CPC or the COA,45
as because the Supreme Court said so.46 However the continuity
arose, though, it cannot be doubted.47 Within the context of this
article, therefore, it is important to note that the "reasonable
jurist" standard has a long lineage in American habeas law and
the federal courts have been (ostensibly) applying it for decades.
There is one other important continuity between the CPC and
COA: district courts' ability to issue and deny COAs.
Interestingly, AEDPA appears to restrict the power to grant COAs
39. See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Opening a Window or
Building a Wall? The Effect of Eighth Amendment Death Penalty Law and
Advocacy on Criminal Justice More Broadly, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 203
(2008) (discussing the impediments to habeas petitioners imposed by
AEDPA's "one-year statute of limitations, its absolute ban on same-claim
second petitions, its higher bar for filing new-claim second petitions, its
onerous exhaustion provisions, and its restrictions on federal evidentiary
hearings").
40. "Circuit justice" referred to Supreme Court justices temporarily
sitting on the courts of appeals. See 28 U.S.C. § 42 (2006).
41. Id. § 2253(c)(1).
42. Id. § 2253(c)(2).
43. Id. § 2253(c)(3).
44. See, e.g., Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 756 (5th Cir. 1996).
45. Compare Act of March 10, 1908, ch. 76, 35 Stat. 40 with 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253.
46. Compare Act of March 10, 1908, ch. 76, 35 Stat. 40 with 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253.
47. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000).
CERTIFIABLE
strictly to circuit judges,48 yet at the same time the Act amended
Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to require a
district judge to rule on certification in the first instance. 49 It is
not clear how this inconsistency emerged, a problem that, as we
shall see, later troubled courts struggling to apply the
contradictory language. 50
Congress considered the question of whether district courts
should be allowed to rule on the appealability of denied habeas
petitions at length during the numerous debates over habeas
reform that preceded the passage of AEDPA. At one point it had
before it a proposal to explicitly strip district judges of the power
to hear applications for CPCs.51 Although it is not clear why the
proposal was drafted, or why it was rejected, it is instructive to
review the testimony the Judiciary Committee heard on the
subject. Eminent scholars spoke on both sides of the question.
While Professor Stephen Gillers of New York University School of
Law warned the Senate Judiciary Committee about "giv[ing] the
district judge the power to block review of his own decision simply
by denying a certificate," 52 Larry Yackle, a law professor at Boston
University (testifying on behalf of the ACLU) remarked that "[i]f
any judge can make a reliable determination regarding the
arguable merit of an appeal, it is . .. the judge who considered the
claim at the trial level."5 Some members of Congress recognized
48. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) ("Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a
certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of
appeals . . . ." (emphasis added)). But see cases cited infra notes 59, 60 and 62
(concluding that the provision allows district judges to issue COAs).
49. The requirement was later moved to Rule 11(a) of the Rules
Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. See FED.
R. APP. P. 22 advisory committee notes to 2009 amendments. Henceforth
"Rule 11(a)" will be used as shorthand for the requirement that district
judges rule on COAs in the first instance for the petitions they deny before
circuit courts can. In the interest of simplicity, this shorthand will be used
even when anachronistically referring to writings predating the 2009
amendments.
50. See cases cited infra note 65.
51. See Robbins, supra note 26, at 329-30 (discussing S. 2216, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), S. 2838, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), and S. 2903, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1982)).
52. The Habeas Reform Act of 1982: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary on S. 2216, 97th Cong. 146 (2d Sess. 1982) (statement of Stephen
Gillers, Professor, N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law).
53. Habeas Corpus Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
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the discrepancy, but their warnings went unheeded and AEDPA
was passed without any attempt to resolve the contradictory
rules. 54
Nonetheless, after a period of uncertainty, 55 Rule 11(a)
curiously trumped § 2253(c)(1), and the power of a district court to
certify habeas appeals became, once again, universally accepted
and, once again, not just an option but an obligation.56 The
rationalization that emerged for this practice is intriguing and
central to the article's thesis.
First, a number of circuit courts acknowledged, as they had
to, the tension-if not the outright irreconcilability-of Rule 11(a)
and § 2253(c)(1).57  In light of such conflict, the reader might
expect that the circuit courts endeavored to discern the policy that
would have made the most sense for Congress to adopt, as courts
are wont to do in such circumstances. 58 For the most part, they
did not. Instead, the seminal circuit court decision on the issue,
the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Hunter v. United States,59
conducted a lengthy exposition on statutory construction,
legislative history, and prior case law before concluding that the
Judiciary on S. 238, 99th Cong. 133 (1st Sess. 1985). It is rather inexplicable
that the ACLU took this position given the constraints it imposes on the
ability of indigent prisoners to obtain appellate review of denied habeas
petitions. See discussion infra Part III.B.2. The Sixth Circuit appeared to
echo this strange perspective on the prisoner's stake in the question,
suggesting that inmates may in fact have a right to the district court passing
on the certification issue, and that a decision placing the power exclusively in
the circuit courts would therefore deprive them of that right. Lyons v. Ohio
Adult Parole Auth., 105 F.3d 1063, 1073 (6th Cir. 1997). It is a unique view
of civil rights that imposes them upon an individual when they are
manifestly aligned against his interests.
54. See Cutler, supra note 26, at 303.
55. See id. at 303-04 & n.101 (collecting early cases finding that district
courts could not issue COAs under AEDPA).
56. See Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 649 n.5 (2012) ("The courts of
appeals uniformly interpret 'circuit justice or judge' to encompass district
judges. Habeas Corpus Rule 11(a) requires district judges to decide whether
to grant or deny a COA in the first instance." (citations omitted)).
57. See, e.g., Lyons, 105 F.3d at 1067 ("The Act's two provisions
governing the issuance of certificates of appealability are in direct conflict
with each other.").
58. See, e.g., In re Gelin, 437 B.R. 435, 441 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2010)
(noting that where legislative intent is unclear, a court will interpret statutes
"as best it can by giving the statutes their most sensible meaning" in context).
59. 101 F.3d 1565 (11th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
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sounder reading of AEDPA endowed district courts with the
authority and the obligation to issue COAs. The remaining
circuits largely took the same position out of politeness to the
Eleventh Circuit, with little or no explanation. 60 We are all
instilled in law school with a healthy fear of circuit splits, of
course, but it is nevertheless breathtaking that the United States
courts of appeals would deal with a difficult and important
question of law by responding en masse: "what they said."61
Even limiting the inquiry to those circuit courts that took the
trouble to conduct an independent analysis, 62 there is still cause
for concern. What is unusual, in a nutshell, is that they say so
little about the pragmatic consequences of the decision. Indeed,
while the specifics of these long and elaborate discussions are
largely irrelevant to the article, the pains that the courts took to
establish, rather implausibly, that the two provisions were
reconcilable (and to thereby establish that an examination of
Congress' policy choice was unnecessary) is nothing short of
remarkable. 63  Simply put, the two provisions obviously butt
heads 64 and only legal acrobatics can make them jibe. Rule 11(a)
explicitly requires a district judge to rule on a COA and §
2253(c)(1) plainly implies that only circuit judges have that
authority. It is therefore particularly striking that the courts of
appeals would place such heavy reliance on statutory construction
60. See United States v. Mitchell, 216 F.3d 1126, 1129-30 (D.C. Cir.
2000); Grant-Chase v. Comm'r, N.H. Dep't of Corrs., 145 F.3d 431, 435 (1st
Cir. 1998); Tiedeman v. Benson, 122 F.3d 518, 521 (8th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Asrar, 108 F.3d 217, 218 (9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam); Lozada v.
United States, 107 F.3d 1011, 1016 (2d Cir. 1997); Else v. Johnson, 104 F.3d
82, 83 (5th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).
61. See, e.g., Grant-Chase, 145 F.3d at 435 (seeing "no reason to reinvent
the wheel" and endorsing the views expressed by the Eleventh Circuit in
Hunter); Lozada, 107 F.3d at 1015 ("We are fully persuaded by Judge
Carnes's careful analysis [in Hunter] of both the ambiguous texts and the
legislative history, and we share his conclusion.").
62. Those decisions are, to varying degrees, Hunter, 101 F.3d 1565,
Lyons, 105 F.3d 1063, United States v. Eyer, 113 F.3d 470 (3d Cir. 1997), and
Houchin v. Zavaras, 107 F.3d 1465 (10th Cir. 1997).
63. See, e.g., Eyer, 113 F.3d at 473 n.1 (acknowledging that its
interpretation was "tortured" but finding it the only one that harmonized the
two provisions).
64. See Lyons, 105 F.3d at 1067 ("The Act's two provisions governing the
issuance of certificates of appealability are in direct conflict with each
other.").
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when dealing with a classic example of directly contrary
legislative pronouncements. 65  It is equally striking that they
would make such a big deal of legislative history when the most
thoughtful and thorough analyses of that history recognized that
it was far too murky and discordant to synthesize in any coherent
fashion. 66 The fact that circuit courts around the country bent
over backwards to reconcile the irreconcilable is in itself an
interesting development, and one that we will return to shortly.
To the extent that circuit courts did have anything to say
about the desirability of one interpretation over the other, it is
interesting what they said. Two themes in particular deserve
mention. One is the proposition that the district court is better
situated to rule on the COA. In other words, the district court has
already received (and presumably reviewed) all of the submissions
in the underlying habeas petition and is therefore well-equipped
to make a decision regarding appealability. 67 The other theme, in
65. The prevailing statutory construction was to read "circuit justice or
judge" in 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) to mean "circuit justice or district judge." See,
e.g., Hunter, 101 F.3d at 1574-84. Although that gloss is not outside the
realm of possibility, it would seem axiomatic that courts should refrain from
inserting terms into statutes where the legislative language is clear on its
face. See, e.g., Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180, 200 (2009) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing court for inserting
words into a statute). Courts adopted such an interpretation on the ground
that the provision was ambiguous, Hunter, 101 F.3d at 1574, but in actuality
the phrase on its own was clear, it was only the history of district judges
granting COAs that made it ambiguous, and it was, circularly, only that
history that clarified the fabricated ambiguity. In any event, regardless of
whether one agrees with the courts of appeals that the provision contained
some ambiguity, the critique that follows stands, because the direction in
which the courts resolved that ambiguity flies in the face of all reason. See
infra Part II.
66. See Lyons, 105 F.3d at 1071 ("In the end, then, none of the Act's
legislative history gives us any indication as to how Congress would decide
this issue."); see also Parker v. Norris, 929 F. Supp. 1190, 1192 (E.D. Ark.
1996) ("[I]t is unlikely contemplation played any role at all in the drafting of
these particular amendments." (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
67. Porterfield v. Bell, 258 F.3d 484, 487 (6th Cir. 2001) ("[B]ecause the
district court is already deeply familiar with the claims raised by petitioner,
it is in a far better position from an institutional perspective than this court
to determine which claims should be certified for appeal."); Alexander v.
Johnson, 211 F.3d 895, 898 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) ("Arguably, the
district court that denies a petitioner relief is in the best position to
determine whether the petitioner has made a substantial showing of a denial
of a constitutional right on the issues before the court."); see Thomas v.
Crosby, 371 F.3d 782, 797 (11th Cir. 2004) (Tjoflat, J., concurring) (citing
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a similar vein, is that district court dispositions of COAs advance
the efficient administration of the federal docket. 68
There is one final feature of these decisions worthy of
comment, and it is another omission. None of them address the
most obvious, commonsense problem with allowing district courts
to deal with COAs: that they have too much invested in their own
rulings to be able to consider them objectively. The most that this
concern gets is a passing mention during a recitation of legislative
history, followed by no discussion of the point.69
In summary, the district courts' power to issue COAs was
restored after AEDPA, and in the face of contradictory legislative
language on the subject, through a m6lange of inter-circuit
courtesy, tortured statutory construction, misguided policy
emphases on expertise and efficiency, and willful obliviousness to
the obvious major objection to the arrangement. In the unlikely
event that the author's view of this jurisprudence has not been
made sufficiently clear, we turn now to a more explicit critique of
its premises before presenting the sample that confirms the point.
II. THE LOGICAL AND PRAGMATIC CASE AGAINST RULE 11(A)
In 1967, Harry A. Blackmun, then a judge on the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals, presented a paper to that court's judicial
conference, where he made the following remarks about a district
court's power to certify the appeal of a habeas petition that it had
denied:
All this adds up, in my mind, to the conclusions that
Alexander, 211 F.3d at 898); see also Catherine T. Struve, Power, Protocol,
and Practicality: Communications from the District Court During an Appeal,
84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2053, 2065 (2009) ("In various situations, then,
[including the COA context], the district court's gatekeeping role requires it
to apply a standard which implicates the merits of the appeal. The district
court's close familiarity with the case will help to inform those rulings, and
the district court's findings will, in turn, assist the court of appeals in
reviewing the gatekeeping decision.").
68. See Alexander, 211 F.3d at 898 ("Further briefing and argument on
the very issues the court has just ruled on would be repetitious."); Lyons, 105
F.3d at 1072 ("[I]t seems clear that a district judge who has just denied a
habeas petition will be able to evaluate that petitioner's request for a [COA]
more quickly than would a circuit judge fresh to the case.").
69. See, e.g., Hunter, 101 F.3d at 1580.
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there is something definitely to be gained by having the
district court, in the first instance, give very careful
consideration to the question whether the state prisoner
federal habeas applicant has something of substance
going for him, and that there is something definitely to be
lost when the district court routinely issues a certificate
of probable cause without this careful consideration....
All this, after all, takes us right back to the philosophy
that this, as with all other matters, is an issue for
decision by the court of general jurisdiction, the district
judge, in the first instance. This, I think, for reasons
which are obvious to all of us, is where the best
considered and important decision is to be made. This is
the normal situation, for in the routine case the district
judge is there to decide and not to bypass the
responsibility of decision.70
Judge Blackmun's eloquent yet profoundly misguided words
are a good place to begin, for they embody many of the flaws in the
belief that district courts have any business ruling on habeas
certifications. First, he establishes a straw man, suggesting that
the "routine" and careless issuance of certification is the principal
evil the judiciary needs to combat. The federal judiciary deals
with a deluge of meritless habeas petitions every day, dismissing
the vast majority of them.7 1  The fear that a district judge,
accustomed to looking at every such petition through jaundiced
eyes, will at the very same time (or shortly after) he concludes the
petition is meritless also thoughtlessly decide that the claims
should proceed further and that his own work should be reviewed,
is implausible to say the least. Such a fear flies in the face of
everything we know about human psychology,72 not to mention
70. Blackmun, supra note 31, at 353.
71. See Frost & Lindquist, supra note 15, at 778 n.183 (noting that
0.29% of habeas petitioners received relief in sample of noncapital cases).
72. For example, in the employment context, research has shown that
self-appraisals are typically more lenient than supervisory appraisals. See
Ted H. Shore, Janet S. Adams & Armen Tashchian, Effects of Self-Appraisal
Information, Appraisal Purpose, and Feedback Target on Performance
Appraisal Ratings, 12 J. Bus. & PSYCHOL. 283, 283-84 (1998).
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judicial decision-making. 73 On the contrary, it is obvious that we
have far more reason to worry that district judges will deny COAs
without adequate and objective contemplation.
Judge Blackmun's second, and more alarming, error is his
assertion that a system in which district judges possess the power
in question is a system more aligned with traditional judicial
practices. Nothing could be further from the truth. As we have
seen, the idea that any claim dismissed by a district judge could
not be appealed to the circuit court is itself an exception to one of
the oldest and most deeply-entrenched principles in the federal
courts. 74 More to the point, Judge Blackmun subtly but crucially
elides the entire crux of the issue when he writes that "this, as
with all other matters, is an issue for decision by ... the district
judge, in the first instance."7 5  Some matters are, of course,
traditionally reserved for the district judge. 76 But the question of
whether a litigant is entitled to appeal has never historically been
categorized alongside such matters.77 The very characterization
of a right to appeal as something that we would think about in
terms of an issue ever decided in the first instance is an odd one,
and it instantly strikes a discordant note. In a good faith effort to
simplify and make sense of a unique and anomalous vehicle,
Judge Blackmun badly misconstrued the issue.
The circuit court jurisprudence justifying the grant of COA-
issuing power to the district courts similarly misconstrues the
issue. As mentioned, that jurisprudence rests on two basic
precepts: 1) the district court is "better situated" to rule on the
COA and 2) judicial efficiency is furthered if they do so rule.79
Although the two precepts might appear to represent independent
73. See, e.g., In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) ("[N]o man can be
a judge in his own case").
74. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175 (1803)
(affirming necessity of appellate review as a force that "revises and corrects
the proceedings in a case already instituted"); see generally Dalton, supra
note 23.
75. Blackmun, supra note 31, at 353 (emphasis added).
76. See, e.g., Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, 475 U.S. 709, 713-14
(1986) (holding that district courts, not appellate courts, conduct fact-
finding).
77. See generally Dalton, supra note 23.
78. See sources cited supra note 67.
79. See cases cited supra note 68.
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grounds, in actuality the second is totally contingent on the first.
That is to say, if the district court is in fact not better situated to
rule on the COA, then it follows that it will not be more efficient to
place it in a gatekeeper role. For if district courts are ill-suited to
judging their own judgments, then circuit courts will be required
to correct all sorts of wrongly decided COAs.80 When a district
court improperly declines to issue a COA, and the petitioner takes
his application to the circuit court, the circuit court will
presumably have to review the same materials and then grant the
COA. 8 1 All the time that the district court spent considering the
application is thus wasted.
Consequently, it all comes down to whether we should trust
the district courts to properly apply the COA standard. If we can,
then yes, efficiency demands that they perform this screening role.
If they cannot, then efficiency demands just the opposite. There is
a very simple, commonsense reason why we cannot, one that is
unfortunately lost in the voluminous jurisprudence and academic
scholarship. As erudite and fair-minded as they may be (and
hopefully are), district judges are people, and people are not the
best judges of their own decisions, regardless of the context. 82
Seen in this light, it is a very odd thing for someone to claim that
the district judge who denies a habeas petition is in the best
position to determine whether a "reasonable jurist" might
disagree. Quite to the contrary, he is possibly in the worst
position to make that call. The statement that a district judge is
ideally situated to make such a decision, because he has already
reviewed all of the relevant submissions and knows the case, and
because the circuit court would otherwise have to replicate all of
that labor, sounds dangerously close to an argument that we
should do away with appellate courts altogether. After all, any
circuit court is duplicating at least some work performed by the
district court, and is reconsidering at least some of the same
materials. At the risk of hyperbolizing, one might as well say,
80. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 132.
81. There is some uncertainty as to whether and how circuit courts
should approach the potential vacatur of COAs improvidently granted by
district courts. See generally Hagglund, supra note 26, at 994-98. This
uncertainty is largely irrelevant to this article, as it focuses on the danger-
far greater-that district courts will improperly deny COAs.
82. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, The Architecture of Jurisprudence, 121
YALE L.J. 2, 48 (2011) (discussing how "judges are people too").
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why have more than one decision-making entity at all?
Indictment, arrest, conviction, sentence, parole, let the district
judge do them all. No need to have prosecutors, law enforcement
officers, juries, and parole boards all reviewing the same
paperwork, it only creates bureaucratic redundancy.
There are certainly arguments that could be devised to
counter this intuitive view,83 but the circuit courts did not
articulate them. In the large majority of cases, the most the issue
got was a passing reference, and universally the circuit courts
declined to engage with it in any meaningful way. 84 The most
cynical explanation for that glaring silence is that it was easier for
the courts of appeals to ignore the real issue. In other words, they
had an internally inconsistent statute that could be plausibly read
to support either result, and they chose the path of least
resistance that had been cleared, after Hunter, by peer courts and
by decades of prior practice. Even this view is not overwhelmingly
cynical, given that the desire to avoid a circuit split on a pervasive
issue is surely not an entirely objectionable one,8 5 and years of
precedent is certainly not an irrelevant factor. 86  On the other
hand, it is still concerning that the circuit courts, squarely
presented with an opportunity to resolve an obvious worry about
the fairness and efficacy of the judicial system, essentially
declined to do so.
Whatever the role of such motivations, there was also
something deeper afoot. The circuit courts were correct that there
is an efficiency interest advanced by the district courts ruling on
COAs, they simply glided over the precise nature of that interest.
It is not, as they suggested, an interest in judicial efficiency,8 ' but
83. For instance, one might argue that district courts are required to
evaluate their own prior judgments in other contexts, such as when they rule
on the merits following a decision regarding preliminary injunctive relief or
when they resolve a motion to alter or amend judgment, and that there is no
reason to doubt the power is properly exercised there.
84. See cases cited supra notes 59, 60, and 62.
85. See, e.g., Robbins, supra note 26, at 317 ("Since habeas corpus deals
with the fundamental liberty of people in custody, should the same petition of
a state prisoner be allowed to proceed on appeal in one jurisdiction but not in
another?").
86. See, e.g., CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 457 (2008)
("Principles of stare decisis, after all, demand respect for precedent whether
judicial methods of interpretation change or stay the same.").
87. See cases cited supra note 68.
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rather an interest in the efficiency of the circuit courts. When
district courts rule on COAs in the first instance, they refuse to
grant them the majority of the time.8 8 Many petitioners will not
reapply to the circuit court, 89 will reapply tardily,90 or will submit
an application that is fatally defective in some respect. 91 In all of
these instances, the circuit court will have to expend a very slight
amount of work, if any.92 Even in the cases where the petitioner
timely and properly reapplies, the circuit court has before it a
decision by the district judge on the precise issue presented, a
helpful resource that likely reduces the time and energy that any
circuit court personnel will be required to devote to the case.9 3
Stated differently, all of the inefficiency engendered by Rule
11(a) lands on the district judges. They are the ones deciding
COA applications improperly, and it is their work that will
potentially be duplicated or corrected. Any contribution that they
make to the circuit courts' workload therefore does in fact expedite
the circuit court docket, because in the absence of that
contribution the circuit courts would be dealing with all of those
cases anyway, plus all of the cases that would not reach them or
that would require far less work. It goes without saying that a
88. There do not appear to be any statistics regarding the percentage of
COAs granted by the district courts, but a general review of the cases
indicates that it is a minority of the time.
89. See Christina L. Boyd & James F. Spriggs II, An Examination of
Strategic Anticipation of Appellate Court Preferences by Federal District
Court Judges, 29 WASH. U. J. L. & PoL'Y 37, 40 fig.1 (2009).
90. Although there are no statistics on how often this occurs, a perusal of
the available cases suggests that it is with some regularity. See, e.g.,
Watkins v. Leyba, 543 F.3d 624, 625-27 (10th Cir. 2008).
91. As with the frequency of COA applications dismissed as time-barred,
there is no data on how often they are denied for other reasons. The research
conducted for this article indicates that circuit courts routinely deny petitions
for various other defects, including for failure to argue the proper issues. See,
e.g., Proffit v. Wyoming, 446 Fed. App'x 83, 85-86 (10th Cir. 2011) (denying a
COA in part because petitioner argued the merits of his claim, rather than
the timeliness issue that resulted in the petition's dismissal below).
92. See Marin K. Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals: Uniformity
and Case Management in the Circuit Courts, 61 DUKE L.J. 315, 333-40 (2011)
(describing how cases with jurisdictional and other technical defects are
screened out and not calendared for oral argument).
93. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND
REFORM 74-75 (2d ed. 1996) ("[Tlhe less time an appellate court spends on a
case the more likely it is simply to affirm the district court or agency,
affirmance being the easy way out.").
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rule that slightly furthers the efficiency of the circuit courts while
dramatically impairing the efficiency of the trial courts is not a
rule that benefits "judicial" efficiency. Indeed, the magnitude of
the inefficiency imposed upon the district courts is, for the same
reasons just set forth, far greater than the gain in increased
efficiency afforded to the circuit courts. Rule 11(a), in a nutshell,
has no rational justification.
All too often in the law, the most logical, commonsense points
are lost in a cloud of analytical hair-splitting and obfuscation. The
universal acceptance of Rule 11(a) over § 2253(c)(1) in the face of
all reason is a textbook example, one that has been almost entirely
ignored by the academy as well as the courts, and one that is
therefore worthy of critique in its own right.
That said, it has long been admitted that logic is not always
the most appropriate signpost to follow in the law. 94 It is not
impossible that district judges are in fact the best reviewers of
their own work, despite the good reasons to suspect otherwise.
With that in mind, we turn to the empirical evidence to confirm
that the commonsense expectation is indeed borne out by reality.
III. THE EMPIRICAL CASE AGAINST RULE 11(A)
The preceding section made the logical and psychological
argument against district judges enjoying the power to rule on
COAs. This section substantiates the argument with concrete
evidence. To cull that evidence, the article looks at the narrowest
but most illuminating context in which district judges rule on
COAs: when a magistrate recommends granting habeas relief and
a district judge declines to do so. Such a situation is the only one
in which the COA standard does not require a speculative
exercise. A "reasonable jurist" has in fact disagreed. 95 Despite
the standard being met on its face, judges across the country have
nevertheless denied COAs and, more to the point, very few have
shown any awareness of the legal significance of the
recommendation. This is a powerful indication that the ability
and obligation to rule on COAs should be removed from the
province of the trial courts and vested exclusively with the courts
94. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881) ("The life
of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.").
95. See infra Part III.A.
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of appeals. To make this case, it is first demonstrated that
magistrates must be considered "reasonable jurists" for purposes
of habeas recommendations before turning to the data.
A. Background on the History of Federal Magistrates
In order to understand how compelling the sample is, it is
important to have some background on United States magistrates
and their role in the judicial system. Beginning with the basics,
magistrates exist to assist district judges with managing their
dockets. 96 In recent years, they have come to represent an ever-
more crucial cog in the federal judicial machine. 97 The types of
cases magistrates handle can vary widely depending on the needs
and preferences of the district judges for whom they work. 98
Nevertheless, as a general matter, in terms of their civil dockets, 99
many magistrates focus on the sorts of claims that move through
the federal system in the greatest quantity: prisoner civil rights
actions, Social Security appeals, and, of course, petitions for
habeas corpus.100 In civil matters, magistrates submit
recommendations to district judges on the proper disposition of
various non-dispositive motions. 101 With respect to dispositive
motions, magistrates submit recommendations and, with the
96. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 142 (1991).
97. See, e.g., Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 928 (1991) ("Given
the bloated dockets that district courts have now come to expect as ordinary,
the role of the magistrate in today's federal judicial system is nothing less
than indispensable.") (citation omitted) (internal quotations marks omitted).
98. See Linda Silberman, Judicial Adjuncts Revisited: The Proliferation
of Ad Hoc Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2131, 2139 (1989) ("[T]he use of
magistrates varies substantially from district to district-often depending
upon the caseload demands of the particular district and the district's
organizational philosophy about the relationship between judge and
magistrate.").
99. Magistrates often handle a wide range of preliminary duties with
respect to criminal proceedings, such as authorizing warrants, as well as
conducting preliminary hearings, arraignments, bond hearings and so forth.
See, Patrick E. Longan, Bureaucratic Justice Meets ADR: The Emerging Role
for Magistrates as Mediators, 73 NEB. L. REV. 712, 749 (1994).
100. See Patrick E. Higginbotham, The Present Plight of the United States
District Courts, 60 DuKE L.J. 745, 759 (2010) ("District courts were quick to
delegate work to magistrate judges, including large volumes of prisoner
petitions-both § 1983 suits and § 2254 habeas petitions-and social security
cases."). Many district courts also refer Title VII employment discrimination
actions to magistrates. See, e.g., Silberman, supra note 98, at 2173.
101. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (2006).
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consent of the parties, issue final orders.102 When a magistrate
resolves a civil case himself, rather than drafting a
recommendation, he does so on behalf of the district court. 103
Consequently, appeal is directly to the circuit court; the district
judge has no further involvement in the case. 104
There are two specific points that one must understand about
the magistrate's role in the judicial system for purposes of this
article. First, the extent to which magistrates have developed
expertise on habeas corpus and, particularly, on § 2254.
Magistrates across the country deal with large numbers of § 2254
petitions every year.1 05 Indeed, the magistrates discussed below
have all worked on numerous § 2254 cases. 106
The second point is the extent to which district judges rely
upon their magistrates. This reliance is evident in several
different ways. Most obviously, district judges are in charge of
hiring and reappointing magistrates. 107  Given that they
personally select the individuals holding the office, and keep them
on-hand at their discretion,10 8 they presumably trust the
judgment of magistrates. It is unsurprising, then, that district
judges tend to approve a substantial majority of the
recommendations submitted to them by magistrates.109 The
magistrates discussed in this article are no exception. An
overview of their recommendations suggests that they are, by
large margins, adopted by the presiding district judge.1 10
102. Id. § 636(c)(3).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See Higginbotham, supra note 100, at 759.
106. A search for "2254" in the Westlaw documents authored by each
magistrate in the sample yielded a collective total of 7031 results. While a
number of these may only reference § 2254 tangentially, the order of
magnitude indicates that they deal with § 2254 issues on a routine basis.
107. See 28 U.S.C. § 631(a) ("The judges of each United States district
court . .. shall appoint United States magistrate judges in such numbers and
to serve at such locations within the judicial districts as the Judicial
Conference [of the United States] may determine . . ...
108. 28 U.S.C. § 631(i).
109. See Gary M. Maveal, Federal Presentence Reports: Multi-Tasking at
Sentencing, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 544, 590 (1996) ("It is widely-known that
the magistrate judge's [report and recommendation] is accepted by the
district court in the vast majority of circumstances .... ).
110. To confirm this proposition, general searches were conducted on
Westlaw for the recommendations of each magistrate in the sample and
2012] 717
718 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 17:695
It warrants mention that, when the prisoner and the
government both consent, magistrates are empowered to issue
final judgment on habeas petitions on behalf of the district court,
just as they are with other civil matters."' In such instances,
district judges have a very limited ability to review the decision of
the magistrate. 112 The magistrates whose work is under
consideration in this article have, like their colleagues across the
country, decided a significant number of habeas corpus petitions
through final orders, rather than recommendations. When they
have done so, they have spoken for the district court itself, just as
much as district judges do in their own final judgments. 113
Finally, and perhaps most to the point, magistrates write
enormous numbers of recommendations on habeas petitions, and
the great bulk of them are accepted either in full or in substantial
part.114  Moreover, the magistrates studied in this article have
written many such recommendations themselves, and an equally
large number have been adopted."15
This section is designed to support three simple propositions,
ones that likely would have been so commonsensical as to not
require support were it not for the counterintuitive sample of
cases discussed below. First, magistrates hold and maintain their
positions by virtue of the fact that the district judges within their
districts regard them as reasonable jurists. Second, one of the
scanned the results for red flags. No magistrate had more than a small
percentage of recommendations so marked, demonstrating that their
recommendations are all approved a substantial majority of the time.
111. See, e.g., Farmer v. Litscher, 303 F.3d 840, 843 (7th Cir. 2002).
112. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3) ("Upon entry of judgment in any case
[where the parties consent to proceed before a magistrate], an aggrieved
party may appeal directly to the appropriate United States court of appeals
from the judgment of the magistrate judge in the same manner as an appeal
from any other judgment of a district court."); id. § 636(c)(4) ("The court may,
for good cause shown on its own motion, or under extraordinary
circumstances shown by any party, vacate a reference of a civil matter to a
magistrate judge under this subsection.").
113. See id. § 636(c)(3) (authorizing magistrates to enter judgments of the
court when the parties consent).
114. See Maveal, supra note 109, at 590 ("[R]eality suggests that
routinely delegating certain classes of cases to magistrate judges (for
example, habeas corpus and Social Security disability) gives those judges the
opportunity to develop an expertise that many federal district judges may
neither have nor want.").
115. A rough overview of the magistrates' recommendations attested to
this proposition.
CERTIFIABLE
major roles that magistrates generally (and the magistrates in the
sample in particular) play is to analyze the meritoriousness vel
non of habeas petitions. Third, and finally, district judges
generally (and the district judges supervising the magistrates
discussed here in particular) view magistrates as reasonable
jurists with respect to their opinions concerning federal habeas
corpus cases.
B. The Data
Having established the background principles necessary to
analyzing the data, we finally turn to the fascinating and
surprising results of the empirical research.
1. The Methodology
We began this project with the goal of assembling an
exhaustive list of every publicly accessible case in which a
magistrate recommended granting § 2254116 relief, and a district
judge then denied relief and ruled on a COA in the case. This
proved too laborious and time-consuming. There are, of course, an
enormous number of § 2254 petitions filed in the federal courts. 117
Precious few result in any kind of relief being granted."' There
are, unfortunately, no words that appear in recommendations to
grant habeas petitions that do not also appear in the far-more-
numerous recommendations to deny them. As a result, it is
116. COAs are always required to appeal denials of motions brought to
vacate federal sentences pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(1)(B), and are sometimes required in actions brought pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241. However, COAs are not always required in § 2241 actions.
See Nancy J. King & Suzanna Sherry, Habeas Corpus and State Sentencing
Reform: A Story of Unintended Consequences, 58 DUKE L.J. 1, 46-47 (2008).
Furthermore, § 2255 motions are directed to the district court that sentenced
the movant. RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2255 CASES IN THE U.S. DIST. CTs., R.
4(a) (2010). It is likely, therefore, that the district judge will have a different
perspective on the case than he would toward state court judgments, from
which he is entirely divorced. As a result, § 2255 COAs potentially implicate
more complex legal and psychological issues. Consequently, the article
focuses on § 2254 cases to generate the purest possible evidence as to the
inability of district judges to question their own decisions.
117. See King, Cheesman II & Ostrom, supra note 11.
118. See Frost & Lindquist, supra note 15, at 778 n.183 (citing King,
Cheesman II & Ostrom, supra note 11, at 52) (noting that 0.29% of habeas
petitioners received relief in a sample of noncapital cases).
2012] 719
720 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 17:695
exceedingly difficult to devise search terms that will call up only
the former,1 1 9 and the researcher is inundated with unhelpful
results. And, needless to say, there is no database with a separate
list of cases in which magistrates have recommended habeas relief
and district judges have declined to issue the writ.
To overcome these research hurdles, a method was engineered
to cull a non-exhaustive but representative sample of such cases.
A search was conducted for every § 2254 recommendation
available on Westlaw for each active magistrate in the country. 120
Within those results, every decision marked with a red flag was
inspected on the assumption that Westlaw would so designate
most recommendations that were rejected either in part or in
full.121 Among those cases, the text was scanned to see whether
the magistrate recommended granting relief and, if so, whether
the district judge declined to do so. For each case that met the
criteria, subsequent history was then consulted through Westlaw
and Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER)122 to
determine whether and how the COA came into play.123  The
results follow.124
119. For example, at the time this article was written, searching all
district court opinions on Westlaw for "recommend! /s grant! Is habeas,"
returned, as the first result, a case in which a magistrate "issued an Order
and Report and Recommendation recommending Respondent's Motion to
Dismiss ... be granted, and that the instant petition for a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 be dismissed without prejudice."
Anderson v. Banks, No. 2:11-CV-276, 2011 WL 5101772, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Oct.
26, 2011).
120. A list of magistrates current through March 16, 2012 was employed,
as ascertained by the websites for each respective judicial district.
121. Westlaw generally follows this practice. It does not do so uniformly,
however, and one case was found through word-of-mouth even though it had
not been given a red flag. See Alonzo v. Thaler, No. 3:07-CV-399, 2011 WL
3566973 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 2011).
122. All unpublished documents cited to electronic court filings (ECF) on
PACER are on file with the author.
123. A small number of cases that were discovered have visible dockets on
PACER, but the individual docket entries could not be opened. See, e.g.,
Letizia v. Walker, No. 97-CV-0300E(F) (W.D.N.Y. 2001); Tunstall v. Hopkins,
126 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (N.D. Iowa 2000). Such cases were counted to the
extent that the outcome with respect to the COAs could be discerned, but
were not placed in any of the categories concerning the reasoning of the
ruling.
124. The results are current through March 16, 2012.
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2. The Cases
The investigation uncovered an intriguing assortment of cases
that have largely flown under the radar.
a. The Numbers
Found forty-seven cases were found where a magistrate
recommended granting a § 2254 petition and a district judge
denied relief and then ruled on a COA.125 The sample involves
forty-two district judges and thirty-nine magistrates. 126 It covers
twenty-two districts in eight circuits. 127
Of the forty-seven cases, the district judge granted a COA
thirty-one times (sixty-six percent) and denied it sixteen (thirty-
four percent).1 28  District courts within the Ninth Circuit were
responsible for forty-eight percent of the granted COAs from the
entire country (fifteen) and nineteen percent of the denied COAs
(three). 129 Thus, if district courts within the Ninth Circuit are
eliminated from the sample, there are fifteen granted COAs (fifty-
four percent) and thirteen denials (forty-six percent).130 For ten of
the fifteen denied COAs, a circuit court ruled on an appeal of the
denial. Five times the higher court granted the COA,131 and five
times it did not. 132
125. See infra Table I.
126. See id. Several cases involve the same judges.
127. See id. The only circuits for which there are no cases are the First,
the Seventh, the Eleventh, and the D.C. Circuits.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id. The sample is not meant to be exhaustive and is, in any
event, too small to make statistically significant regional distinctions. It is
nonetheless notable that there is such a sharp contrast between the Ninth
Circuit and its sister circuits.
131. Order Granting a COA, Lawwill v. Pineda, No. 11-3645 (6th Cir. Feb.
24, 2012); Order, Goldberg v. Maloney, No. 11-3305 (6th Cir. Nov. 28, 2011),
ECF No. 108; Order, Quinn v. Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Corrs., No. 10-3490
(6th Cir. Sept. 21, 2011), ECF No. 25; Order, Hood v. Wilson, No. 09-3165
(6th Cir. July 22, 2009), ECF No. 25; Order, Pordash v. Hudson, No. 07-4141
(6th Cir. June 19, 2008), ECF No. 27. Citations to ECF documents containing
circuit court orders refer to the orders' ECF numbers on the underlying
district court docket, although when referring to filings of a circuit court, the
case numbers cited refer to the circuit court's case numbers.
132. Order, Salinas v. Thaler, No. 10-40984 (5th Cir. Feb. 14, 2011), ECF
No. 68; Mathers v. Seifert, 296 F. App'x 375, 376 (4th Cir. 2008) (per curiam);
Order, Pordash v. Hudson, No. 07-4171 (6th Cir. Mar. 18, 2008), ECF No. 26;
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b. The Content
Because of the cursory nature of these orders, a description of
their content can be nearly as brief as a summary of the numbers.
Nevertheless, there are several features that merit comment.
First, the brevity of the orders is itself remarkable. A number
of the decisions were rendered in form orders, where the district
judge simply checked a line to indicate the disposition of the COA.
Interestingly, this was done both by judges granting COAs,133 and
those denying them.134 In the same vein, the great majority of the
orders, whether they grant or deny the COA, contain little to no
analysis. 135 A number of them simply concisely state the COA
standard and then summarily conclude that it is satisfied or
unsatisfied with no discussion of the details of the case, let alone
mention that a federal judge deemed the petition meritorious. 136
Slightly more conscientious district judges make passing mention
of the magistrate's recommendation, but give no indication that
Order, Gooden v. Dretke, No. 03-10578 (5th Cir. Feb. 24, 2004), ECF No. 32;
Letizia v. Walker, No. 97-CV-0300E(F) (2d Cir. Sept. 8, 2003), ECF. No. 80.
133. See e.g., Certificate of Appealability, Higgins v. Cain, No. 09-2330
(E.D. La. Apr. 14, 2011), ECF No. 52; Order on Certificate of Appealability
and In Forma Pauperis Status, DeBerry v. Ryan, No. CV 04-0858-PCT-SMM
(D. Ariz. Oct. 28, 2009), ECF No. 75; Order Re: Certificate of Appealability,
Wyrick v. Mendoza-Powers, No. 1:05-CV-1194 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2008), ECF
No. 33 [hereinafter Wyrick COA Order]; Hayes v. Quarterman, No. 3-05-CV-
1974-M (N.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 2008), ECF No. 66.
134. Certificate of Appealability, McCullough v. Warden, LSP, No.
1:05CV0674 (W.D. La. Dec. 4, 2008), ECF No. 51; Certificate as to
Appealability, Gooden v. Dretke, No. 3:00-CV-0286-P (N.D. Tex. Sept. 10,
2003), ECF No. 28 [hereinafter Gooden COA Order].
135. For example, one form order in the sample includes a space for the
judge to indicate the reason that he granted the COA, in which he instead
handwrote the certified issue, while declining to articulate any reasoning to
support the result. Wyrick COA Order, supra note 133.
136. See, e.g., Order Denying Certificate of Appealability, Goldberg v.
Maloney, No. 4:03 CV 2190 (N.D. Ohio July 7, 2011), ECF No. 107
[hereinafter Goldberg COA Order]; Salinas v. Johnson, No. C-02-214, 2010
WL 3732059, at *10 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 20, 2010); Larson v. Glebe, No. C09-
1453Z, 2010 WL 2486428, at *5 (W.D. Wash. June 16, 2010); Order and
Opinion Granting Certificate of Appealability, Mitchell v. Jones, No. CIV-06-
503-RAW-KEW (E.D. Okla. Apr. 27, 2010), ECF No. 38; Order, Moeller v.
Lockyer, No. 2:01-CV-2351 FCD JFM (HC) (E.D. Cal. July 8, 2009), ECF No.
29; Rucker v. Patrick, No. 07cv0364-IEG (RBB), 2008 WL 4104230, at *16
(S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2008); Order Granting Certificate of Appealability, Smith
v. Romanowski, No. 05-73711 (E.D. Mich. May 1, 2007), ECF No. 27.
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they think it relevant to the "reasonable jurist" standard.137 Some
do not even bother to include the COA standard.138
Perhaps most interesting of all is what district judges offer,
and what they do not offer, by way of analysis, when they do
endeavor to justify the decision. To begin with the latter, they
rarely point to the magistrates' recommendations as a
consideration in their calculus, either one that supports the grant
of a COA or one that must be dealt with in order to deny the COA.
District judges explicitly noted their disagreement with the
magistrate as a factor relevant to their ruling on the COA only
eight times, seven times when granting a COA,139 and one time
when denying a COA,140 meaning that they noted their
137. See, e.g., Johnson v. Finn, No. Civ. S 03-2063 JAM JFM P (E.D. Cal.
Mar. 23, 2010), ECF No. 71.
138. See, e.g., Amended Judgment Order, Lawwill v. Pineda, No. 1:08 CV
2840 (N.D. Ohio June 15, 2011), ECF No. 41; Armitage v. Clark, No. 09cv463-
L, 2011 WL 1584946, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2011); McDonald v. Lebanon,
No. 3:08 CV 1718, 2010 WL 3036730, at *13 (N.D. Ohio July 30, 2010); Quinn
v. Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Corrs., No. 3:09 CV 546, 2010 WL 1433400, at *4
(N.D. Ohio Apr. 7, 2010); Corona v. Almager, No. 07cv2117-BTM (NLS), 2009
WL 3246452, at *15 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2009); Bell v. Anderson, No. 1:05-CV-
2415, 2006 WL 2864121, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 29, 2009); Hood v. Bobby, No.
3:07 CV 3319, 2009 WL 111633, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 15, 2009); Brooks v.
Eberlin, No. 4:07CV2162 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 31, 2008), ECF No. 30; Order,
Yenawine v. Motley, No. 3:06CV-413-R (W.D. Ky. Feb. 7, 2008), ECF No. 19;
Certificate of Appealability, Holley v. Yarborough, No. CIV S-02-0310 RRB
JFM P (E.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2008), ECF No. 31; Pordash v. Hudson, No. 1:06
CV 836, 2007 WL 2229833, at *3 (N.D. Ohio July 31, 2007). Some of these
decisions have the "appeal cannot be taken in good faith" language from 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) (2006), but none have any of the "reasonable jurist" or
"substantial constitutional issue" or "deserving encouragement" to go forward
language from § 2253(c)(2) or the Supreme Court's COA cases.
139. Howard v. Warden, Lebanon Corr. Inst., No. 3:08-cv-424, 2012 WL
395186, at *8 n.7 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 7, 2012); Rosser v. Cate, No. 10-CV-2203
MMA (WVG), 2012 WL 170077, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2012); Order
Granting Certificate of Appealability at 2, Davis v. Guirbino, No. CV 06-7315
VBF (FFM) (C.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2011) [hereinafter Guirbino COA Order], ECF
No. 42; Askew v. Phillips, No. 1:06-cv-708, 2010 WL 2802280, at *8 (W.D.
Mich. July 13, 2010); Order Issuing a Certificate of Appealability at 2,
Thompson v. Sisto, No. CIV. 2:07-2577 WBS JFM (HC) (E.D. Cal. Apr. 13,
2010), ECF No. 21 [hereinafter Sisto COA Order]; Matthews v. Purkett, No.
4:06-CV-925 (CEJ), 2009 WL 2982912, at *11 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 14, 2009);
Sargent v. Kelchner, No. 03-327 Erie, 2005 WL 5298488, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Aug.
22, 2005).
140. In the order denying a certificate of appealability, the district judge
denied a COA due to mootness but noted that she would have granted one, in
part because of the magistrate's recommendation, were it not for the
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disagreement in twenty-three percent of the grants and seventeen
percent of the total sample.141
What factors do the district judges cite, then, if not the
magistrate's recommendation? It varies. Some district judges
refer to their opinion dismissing the petition on the merits as a
reason, in and of itself, to deny a COA.142 In a typical formulation
of this approach, a district judge in the Eastern District of
California wrote that "[fJor the reasons set forth in this court's ...
order [denying habeas relief], petitioner has not made a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.
Accordingly, a certificate of appealability should not issue in this
action."1 43 Similarly, a district judge in the Northern District of
Texas had this to say about why a COA was inappropriate: "[fjor
the reasons stated in the Court's Order accepting in part and
denying in part the Recommendation of the ... Magistrate ... ,
the Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that jurists of reason
would find it debatable whether" he was entitled to relief.144
Another district judge appears to use a form order that makes the
same point,145 presumably one that is used where magistrates
mootness. Order Denying Certificate of Appealability at 3-6, Stallworth v.
Salazar, No. CV 05-03829 (C.D. Cal. June 14, 2010), ECF No. 57 [hereinafter
Stallworth COA Order].
141. In several cases, the district judge either mentioned the magistrate's
disagreement and/or issued a COA on only the grounds upon which the
magistrate recommended relief, but did not suggest that the disagreement
itself constituted satisfaction of the "reasonable jurist" standard. See, e.g.,
Order on Reconsideration Motion and to Enter Judgment at 3-4, Gregory v.
Chavez, No. CV F 98-6521 LJO MJS HC (E.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2011), ECF No.
134 (declining to rely upon disagreement but then finding that "a limited
COA is proper as to the claims which [the] Magistrate
Judge . . . recommended granting"). These cases are not included in note 139,
supra.
142. See e.g., cases cited infra notes 143, 144, and 145.
143. Order at 2, Saifullah v. Carey, No. CIV S-02-2664 MCE DAD P (E.D.
Cal. Dec. 20, 2006), ECF No. 55 [hereinafter Saifullah COA Order].
144. Order of the Court on Certificate As to Appealability, Alonzo v.
Thaler, No. 3:07-CV-399 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 2011), ECF No. 92.
145. Gooden COA Order, supra note 134, at 1; see also Goldberg COA
Order, supra note 136, at 3 ("For the reasons stated in this Court's
Memorandum Opinion and Order, a reasonable jurist could not conclude that
dismissal of the Petition is in error or that Petitioner should be permitted to
proceed further."); Quinn v. Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Corrs., No. 3:09 CV 546,
2010 WL 1433400, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 7, 2010) ("[F]or the reasons stated
herein and in the Report and Recommendation, the Court certifies . . . that
there is no basis upon which to issue a [COA]."); Order at 12, Benchoff v.
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recommend denial as well.
Other district judges present a vague and cursory description
of the reasons that moved them to grant the COA.146 Still others,
perhaps the most interesting of all, seek to show that reasonable
jurists could disagree, but do so without reference to the
ostensibly reasonable jurist who has already disagreed.147
c. Analysis
These ostensibly routine orders are modest in length and size,
but, as the following analysis shows, they constitute powerful
evidence that something has gone badly awry in the federal
judiciary.
i. Understanding the Sample
As an initial matter, it bears repeating that the sample is not
exhaustive, and is, by any accounting, a small one. It does not
speak directly to any pervasive, overwhelming trends in the
federal judiciary. Then again, the question under consideration is
an extremely narrow one, and it would therefore be unreasonable
to expect a large sample. Furthermore, the breadth of the sample
in terms of the numbers of judges, districts, and circuits
involved1 48 suggests that the problem, such as it is, is not an
isolated or an exceptional one.
What, then, do the data mean? Recall that a district judge is
Colleran, No. 03-CV-740-ARC (M.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 2006), ECF No. 106 ("The
Court also denies a [COA], based on the above analysis.").
146. See, e.g., Elder v. Berghuis, 644 F. Supp. 2d 888, 904 (W.D. Mich.
2009) (issuing a COA with reference to various iterations of the standard);
Walbey v. Quarterman, No. G-99-496, 2008 WL 6841900, at *40 (S.D. Tex.
Feb. 20, 2008) (issuing a COA because of "the complex factual record and the
serious issues" raised by the petitioner).
147. Order at 1 n.1, Rhodes v. Varano, No. 08-3236 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 17,
2011), ECF No. 36 (citing the absence of appellate precedent addressing "the
precise circumstances presented by this case"); Somers v. Schwartz, No. 2:04-
cv-00698-JKS-KJM, 2007 WL 4530867, at *4 n.5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2007)
(citing four different California state court decisions to show that the law was
uncertain so as to justify a COA). In perhaps the most remarkable statement
in the sample, the district court in Mathers v. Seifert related that the
magistrate believed relief should be granted and then proceeded to describe
its own, contrary position as "not debatable." Order at 2, Mathers v. Seifert,
No. 6:07-cv-00734 (S.D. W. Va. July 7, 2008), ECF No. 19,
148. See supra text accompanying notes 126-27.
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required to grant a COA if a "reasonable jurist" could debate the
result.149 When a magistrate recommends issuing the writ, he or
she has, quite plainly, "debated" the district judge's conclusion. In
other words, if the district judge declines, in such circumstances,
to issue a COA, the judge is essentially declaring: the magistrate
is not a reasonable jurist. It is astonishing, in the author's view,
that a third of the district judges who have been presented with
this question-is the magistrate a reasonable jurist or not-have
answered in the negative. 150 It is even more astonishing that only
seventeen percent of the district judges presented with the
question seem to even realize what the question is. 5 ' That is,
only that paltry number regarded it as even relevant that the
magistrate disagreed with them.
To digest the importance of these numbers, it is worth
returning for a moment to the purpose and role of magistrates, the
purpose and role of COAs, and the general nature of federal
habeas review. Magistrates serve entirely at the pleasure of
district judges.1 52  District judges appoint magistrates, and
magistrates' primary purpose is to make district judges' lives
easier.' 5 3  Unsurprisingly, district judges generally follow the
recommendations of their magistrates-who they have, after all,
appointed for the very reason that they trust them to make sound
recommendations-a large majority of the time. 154
COAs, like magistrates, were created with efficiency in
mind.155 They were invented to reduce the amount of judicial
resources expended on frivolous appeals.156 Likewise, the decision
to allow district courts to issue COAs was plainly done to free up
the circuit courts from a torrent of meritless habeas claims.157
Finally, § 2254 habeas review has been gradually restricted to
only those cases where state inmates are being held in egregious
violation of the United States Constitution and the inmates have
149. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
150. See cases cited supra note 128 and accompanying text.
151. See cases cited supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
152. 28 U.S.C. § 631(i) (2006).
153. See supra Part III.A.
154. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
155. See supra Part I.B.2.
156. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
157. See supra Part I.B.2.
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met the onerous procedural requirements imposed by AEDPA.15 8
As a consequence, the federal courts very seldom grant any type of
relief to § 2254 petitioners. 159
Considered in this light, the data is even more striking. A
district judge who denies a COA after a magistrate recommends
issuing the writ has before her the exceedingly rare case in which
a federal judge believes that the Constitution has been so badly
transgressed that the federal judiciary should take the
extraordinary step of ordering a state penal system to release a
prisoner. For such a judge to disagree with that step is
unremarkable. But it is almost incredible that she would not only
disagree, but also rule that the magistrate-whose judgment the
district judge routinely relies upon-is so unreasonable that the
petitioner has no right to higher review, a right that litigants
possess in almost every other circumstance.
The manner in which district judges make this extraordinary
decision is, if possible, even more extraordinary. They do not
recite the magistrates' recommendations in detail and then
attempt, through considered analysis, to demonstrate that the
magistrates were so unreasonable as to make an appeal
unnecessary. In fact, they almost never even mention the
magistrates' recommendations with respect to the COA
determination.160 By and large, they rule on the COA in the same
fashion as they would in any other case (i.e., in any case where the
magistrate recommended against habeas relief). That is, they
issue a pro forma opinion, briefly stating the standard
158. See supra notes 14 and 39 and accompanying text.
159. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
160. See cases cited supra notes 139 and 140. In one interesting case
from the sample, the district judge mentioned the disagreement she had with
the magistrate's recommendation, but then proceeded to conduct the
reasonable jurist" test in the abstract, rather than simply noting that a
"reasonable jurist" had in fact disagreed. Guirbino COA Order, supra note
139, at 2 ("Although the Court disagrees with the [Report and
Recommendation] .. . the Court does not find the decision recommended in
the [Report and Recommendation] to be outside of the possible decisions
reached by a reasonable jurist."). Such a passage reinforces the notion that
judges are incapable of soundly assessing their own decisions. That judge,
after all, acknowledged the disagreement with a reasonable jurist, and still
felt compelled to pose the test in the abstract when it had been answered
concretely.
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(sometimes), before summarily denying or granting the COA.' 6 '
Indeed, if they cite anything at all to support the COA denial, they
typically do so in a passing reference to their own opinion on the
merits. 162 In so doing, they imply that the mere existence of a
district judge's opinion disagreeing with a magistrate's
automatically signifies that the latter is the product of an
unreasonable jurist's mind.
ii. Interpreting the Data
There are two ways to take the surprising ease with which
district judges ignore conflicting magistrate recommendations
when ruling on COAs in such circumstances. Taking the most
literal route, one could interpret the sample as an explicit
declaration by the district judge that she does not regard her
magistrate as a reasonable jurist. Although logical, this
interpretation is belied by the pragmatic reality. Magistrates are
appointed by district judges, they serve only while they retain
their trust, and their recommendations are overwhelmingly
accepted.163 Indeed, a review of the records established by the
magistrates who authored the recommendations that were denied
with no COA issued does not suggest that they differ at all from
their colleagues across the country in terms of the general
agreement they elicit from the district judges.164 In other words,
these district judges do have faith that these magistrates are
reasonable jurists.
The alternative is simple: the district judges were unable or
unwilling to apply the proper standard. They knew that they
were supposed to issue a COA if a reasonable jurist could
disagree; they knew that a reasonable jurist-by their own
standards-had in fact disagreed; and yet they could not or would
not issue a COA for that reason alone. Why?
There is certainly reason to believe that courts sometimes
willfully refuse to apply legally mandated standards, including in
the realm of habeas.165 Nevertheless, this is not such a case. On
161. See cases cited supra notes 136-38.
162. See e.g., cases cited supra notes 143-45.
163. See supra Part III.A.
164. See supra note 113-15 and accompanying text.
165. See, e.g., Christopher E. Smith, Judicial Reform of Habeas Corpus:
The Advocates' Lament, 44 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 47, 56 (1996) (describing
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the contrary, the most reasonable way to understand these cases
is as a demonstration of why judges are constitutionally (in the
psychological, not the legal, sense) incapable of effectively judging
their own work.
One major factor supporting this explanation is the meager
rationales put forth by the district judges in the sample who did
issue a COA. By and large, these judges did not simply say, as
one would expect them to: I am required by law to grant a COA if
a reasonable jurist could disagree with my conclusion; the
magistrate disagreed with my conclusion; the magistrate was
hired by myself and my colleagues to serve as a reasonable jurist,
we agree with him the vast majority of the time, and we therefore
regard him as a reasonable jurist; ergo, a reasonable jurist could
disagree and the COA is granted. Instead, the district judges who
grant COAs are mostly as summary and opaque in their reasoning
as are those who deny them. 166 If they do offer any reasoning, it is
typically substantially more abstract and removed from the
specifics of the case than the straightforward rationale suggested
above.167 This failure reflects a deeper problem with COAs as a
whole: judges are simply unable to think in a meaningful way
about their own level of self-certainty.
In a sense, it is not that surprising that district judges lack
this ability. As officers of trial courts, they are accustomed to
assume that appellate review will always be available for litigants
dissatisfied with their rulings. Indeed, any attentive observer who
sits in on federal trials or motion hearings will get used to hearing
comments from the bench to the effect of, "this ruling may be
wrong, but it's what I think, and if I'm wrong the circuit court will
let me know." 68  The mindset of the district judge is deeply
intertwined with this self-conception as the first judge, whose
work will be the subject of higher review if any party desires it.
COAs are entirely foreign to such a self-conception, for they allow
practitioners who suspect that the lower federal courts "evade[ the Supreme
Court's decisions" on habeas cases).
166. See cases cited supra notes 133 and 135-38.
167. See cases cited supra notes 146 and 147.
168. See, e.g., Todd A. Buchman, Comment, Due Process and Sentencing:
Third Circuit Holds That Plea of Guilt Waives Fifth Amendment Privilege,
103 DICK. L. REV. 227, 237-38 & nn.96 & 97 (1998) (quoting a federal trial
judge suggesting an attorney take up an uncertain issue on appeal).
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district judges to become, at least in the first instance, the
decision-maker about the very possibility of appellate review. The
sample above vividly highlights the futility of asking trial judges
to ignore hundreds of years of judicial psychology and become the
gatekeepers to review of their own decisions.
Now, one might lodge the following objecting to this
interpretation of the data: "this sample illustrates nothing
profound about the decision-making process in the federal
judiciary; COAs are routine, mundane business, and district
judges are simply treating them as such. If the judges made some
mistakes in these cases, it was only because the situation was so
unusual and they are so accustomed to issuing rote orders with
COAs."
The first response to this "mountain out of a molehill"
argument is: so what? That is, it makes no difference whether
judges are ignoring the "reasonable jurist" standard deliberately
or inadvertently. The fact remains that they are ignoring it.
Indeed, to suggest that judges are only issuing these orders
because they are so accustomed to issuing them in the context of
frivolous habeas petitions only underscores the significance of the
sample. These are not frivolous petitions; they are petitions found
meritorious by federal judges. If a district judge fails to register
that distinction, then he is failing to thoughtfully judge his own
work-product, whether consciously or unconsciously.
The second response is that the criticism makes no sense in
light of the small but illuminating group of cases in which district
judges said exactly what is suggested here they ought to: "In light
of the differing conclusions reached by the undersigned and the
assigned Magistrate Judge, 'jurists of reason' could reach different
conclusions with respect to the merits of petitioner's petition."l 69
As this quotation demonstrates, and as several others confirm,170
169. Sisto COA Order, supra note 139, at 2.
170. Howard v. Warden, Lebanon Corr. Inst., No. 3:08-cv-424, 2012 WL
395186, at *8 n.7 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 7, 2012) ("Here, the Magistrate Judge and
the District Judge diverged . . .. Thus, the Court grants a certificate of
appealability... ."); Rosser v. Cate, No. 10-cv-2203 MMA (WVG), 2012 WL
170077, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2012); Askew v. Phillips, No. 1:06-cv-708,
2010 WL 2802280, at *8 (W.D. Mich. July 13, 2010) ("[T]he plaintiff meets
the standard for a COA, because other reasonable jurists-such as the
learned Magistrate Judge here-could disagree with the [district judge's]
determination . . . ."); Stallworth COA Order, supra note 140, at 6 ("Given
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it is not a difficult thing to correctly apply the "reasonable jurist"
standard to the cases in the sample. If anything, it is the easiest
approach to take, because it requires no laborious speculation on
the possible perspective of some theoretical reasonable jurist.
That so few district judges managed to get it right therefore
cannot be chalked up to simple absent-mindedness alone. At
most, it was an absent-mindedness that underscores the theory
advanced by this article.
This point is further supported by the cases in which district
judges did attempt to apply the proper standard, but seemed
oblivious to the fact that a "reasonable jurist" had already
satisfied it.171 Here, it cannot be said that district judges were
simply seeking to avoid more work, because they were actually
imposing on themselves additional labor.
And finally, in perhaps the most arresting evidence of all, a
number of district judges regarded their own opinions denying
habeas relief as evidence, in and of itself, to deny a COA.172 A
judge who takes such a position with absolutely no explanation, as
many of these judges did, implies that anything he thinks cannot,
by definition, be debated by a reasonable jurist. It is difficult to
imagine a more complete perversion of the standard. If a district
judge's view that habeas relief is unwarranted is per se proof that
no reasonable jurist could disagree, even where another federal
judge has already voiced disagreement, there would be no point in
even having a COA. The denial itself would constitute an
adequate explanation as to why no appeal was appropriate.
In sum, it is impossible to regard the sample as anything
other than incontrovertible evidence of the widespread inability of
the ... contrary opinions from this court, 'reasonable jurists could debate
whether ... the petition should have been resolved in a different manner.'
(citation omitted)); Matthews v. Purkett, No. 4:06-CV-925 (CEJ), 2009 WL
2982912, at *11 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 14, 2009) ("The magistrate judge, for whom
the Court holds much respect, concluded that petitioner was denied effective
assistance of appellate counsel. Clearly, the issue is one that is 'debatable
among reasonable jurists."'); Sargent v. Kelchner, No. 03-327 Erie, 2005 WL
5298488, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2005) ("[W]hile we conclude that each of
Petitioner's grounds for relief lack merit, we recognize that reasonable jurists
could disagree with our resolution of Petitioner's Rule 102 claim, as
evidenced by the Magistrate Judge's conclusion in her report and
recommendation.").
171. See cases cited supra note 147.
172. See e.g., cases cited supra notes 142-45.
2012] 731
732 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 17:695
district judges to sufficiently evaluate their own decisions.
iii. Implications
The sample presents two major implications, two simple and
specific, a third subtler and more sweeping. Most obvious and
easiest, the Supreme Court should unequivocally declare that
where a magistrate recommends relief and a district judge denies
it, the standard for issuance of a COA has been met, at least on
the grounds underlying the magistrate's recommendation, and
there is no need for further analysis. Any decision to the contrary,
the Supreme Court should add, is therefore in error. 173 The ruling
would require only a cursory, per curiam writing, and would serve
as a healthy reminder to the lower courts to obey the "reasonable
jurist" standard in the one instance where the standard is met on
its face. In fact, there is an interesting argument to be made that
the Supreme Court is legally obligated to take up these
erroneously denied COAs.174 Although that argument implicates
many issues outside the scope of the article, it adds substantial
support to a demand that the Supreme Court correct, as soon as it
can, the problem reflected by the sample.
If the Supreme Court desired to cite more than simply the
blatant violation of the "reasonable jurist" standard to justify such
a decision, it would also have handy more pragmatic
considerations. Primary among these would be the great irony
that two mechanisms created with the principal aim of
efficiency-magistrates 75 and COAs 176-give rise to enormous
inefficiency because of Rule 11(a). When a district judge is
173. The Supreme Court has recently and repeatedly passed up the
opportunity to make such a declaration. See, e.g., Salinas v. Thaler, 131 S.
Ct. 3067, reh'g denied, 132 S. Ct. 66 (2011). As evidenced by the subsequent
histories of the cases listed infra in Table I, however, habeas petitioners are
nothing if not vigorous in the pursuit of legal vindication, and the occasion for
the Supreme Court to pass on such a question will surely arise in the near
future.
174. See Brent E. Newton, Applications for Certificates of Appealability
and the Supreme Court's "Obligatory" Jurisdiction, 5 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 177, 178 (2003) (positing that "[t]he [Supreme] Court, or at least
the single Circuit Justice to whom a COA application is directed, has a legal
obligation to rule on the merits of a COA application, applying the same legal
standard that governs district and circuit judges in COA cases").
175. See supra Part III.A.
176. See supra Part I.B.
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required to rule on a COA after a magistrate has recommended
relief and the district judge denies the writ, there are several
possible sequences for what follows (assuming the petitioner
continues to pursue relief).1 77 In one, the district judge denies the
COA and the circuit court follows the law and grants it. 178 In
another, the district court denies the COA and the circuit court
commits the same mistake and denies it a second time. 179 In a
third, the district court follows the law and grants the COA in the
first instance, allowing the petitioner to proceed on appeal.180 In
none of these cases does Rule 11(a) further efficiency in such a
way as to reasonably balance it with the demands of the law. For
only in the second circumstance is efficiency facilitated, and only
because the petitioner is wrongly stripped of his right to appeal.
In other words, if the COA functions properly, there will always be
some duplication of work by the district and circuit courts, and
potentially even by the Supreme Court. The mistake is regarding
this duplicativeness as problematic, when it is simply a by-product
of the normal appellate process, i.e., a "problem" with our legal
system as a whole. Stated yet another way, all of the efficiency
created by the COA is conserved and strengthened if the courts of
177. If the petitioner declines to pursue further recourse, one could argue
that efficiency has been served, because the district court has summarily
disposed of the matter without burdening the court of appeals. On the other
hand, it would be served only at the price of sacrificing the integrity of the
law, a trade-off that is surely undesirable. See, e.g., Carter v. Chi. Police
Officers, 165 F.3d 1071, 1078 (7th Cir. 1998) ("When considering which
methods to employ, it is of paramount importance that fairness and clarity
are not sacrificed for the sake of efficiency and expediency in a particular
case.").
178. See e.g., cases cited supra note 131.
179. See e.g., cases cited supra note 132.
180. In yet another possible path, the district judge neglects to rule on the
COA at all, for whatever reason, and the circuit court has to remand for that
determination alone. See, e.g., Letter from U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit to M. Neal Cox, Bell v. Anderson, No. 06-4558 (6th Cir. Dec. 5,
2006), ECF No. 23; Order, Benchoff v. Colleran, No. 06-3391 (3d Cir. Sept. 28,
2006), ECF No. 105. Although this eventuality does not speak to the precise
question considered by the article, it does underscore the inefficiency of Rule
11(a) generally. Indeed, Benchoff is an especially glaring illustration of that
inefficiency, for the district judge proceeded to deny the COA on remand, id.
at ECF 106,, after which the Third Circuit granted it, id. at ECF 108,
resulting in several completely unnecessary transfers between the courts
(and corresponding lengthy delays) before they managed to reach the obvious
result.
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appeals and Supreme Court have the sole authority to issue it.181
While it is indisputable that the Supreme Court should
correct the basic error occurring in the sample, such a ruling
would only go so far, for it would deal directly with only a narrow
subset of cases. The broader lesson here, simply put, is that Rule
11(a) is a failure. District judges should not be allowed, let alone
required, to rule on motions for COAs after denying habeas relief.
If they cannot consistently (indeed, if they cannot unvaryingly)
grant a COA under the "reasonable jurist" standard when a
magistrate disagrees with the ultimate ruling, the easiest possible
circumstance in which to make a decision and plausibly defend it,
then they cannot fairly apply the standard under any
circumstances. Consequently, Rule 11(a) should be abolished and
the district courts, either by virtue of their own rule-making
authority or by the dictate of the circuit courts, the Supreme
Court, or Congress, should get out of the business of issuing and
denying COAs.182
The other implication is that we need to rethink how the
judiciary approaches similar but less obvious types of self-judging.
In motions for preliminary injunctions, for example, a movant
must demonstrate, inter alia, a "substantial likelihood of success
on the merits."18 3 When a district judge denies such a motion and
181. Although Judge Friendly did not appreciate the pitfalls of self-
judging, he was sensitive to this point regarding the efficient allocation of
judicial resources. Friendly, supra note 12, at 144 n.9 ("In view of the
staggering growth in the case loads of the courts of appeals and prospective
further increases as the ratio of criminal appeals to convictions after trial
approaches 100%, Congress should move promptly to amend [the habeas
statute] so as to place the authority to issue certificates of probable cause
solely in the courts of appeals . . . ." (citation omitted)).
182. One potential piece of evidence weighing against this proposal is the
troubling ease with which circuit courts themselves appear to deny COAs
after magistrates have recommended relief. See cases cited supra note 132.
However, it can be assumed either that this sample is too small to be
representative or that the preceding erroneous district court ruling
predisposed the court of appeals to commit the same error. See POSNER,
supra note 93 ("[T]he less time an appellate court spends on a case the more
likely it is simply to affirm the district court or agency, affirmance being the
easy way out."). If the assumption is erroneous and circuit courts are simply
as incapable of conscientiously applying the "reasonable jurist" standard as
are district courts, even when their own decision is not the one under review,
then the judiciary is so hopeless that there is no point in seeking to improve
any area of law.
183. See, e.g., Benten v. Kessler, 505 U.S. 1084, 1085 (1992) (per curiam).
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later has before her a dispositive motion she is, in effect, re-
judging her initial determination. Although the situation is less
black-and-white than in the COA context, given that substantial
additional briefing and possibly evidentiary submissions have
presumably occurred since the initial ruling, the results here
suggest that we have reason to be wary of a district judge's
capacity for a well-reasoned and consistent application of the
standard. Similarly, and perhaps even more problematically,
motions to alter or amend judgments require district judges to
revisit a decision that was made rather recently.18 4 If the COA
sample here is taken at face-value, it seems likely that judges are
often unable to truly "reconsider" their recent rulings, as required
by Rule 59. ss
Unlike the COA setting, where the solution is clear (get rid of
Rule 11(a)), the appropriate reforms to make in these other legal
contexts are less obvious. It would not make sense to remove
motions for preliminary injunctions and motions to reconsider
from the district courts to the courts of appeals, as it does with the
COA, because there is plainly a pressing need to have the trial
courts rule on these motions in the first instance. 18 6 In light of
that need, one possible solution would be to require a different
judge to rule on the motions than ruled earlier. Unfortunately,
there is insufficient space here to develop such proposals here,
hopefully other commentators make use of our groundwork to
raise similar questions in different areas of law.
CONCLUSION
As was noted at the outset of this article, it is a great thing
that legal scholarship covers, in such voluminous detail, the
184. See FED. R. Civ. P. 59.
185. Id.
186. See Judge v. Quinn, 612 F.3d 537, 557 (7th Cir. 2010) (emphasizing
that preliminary injunctive relief is warranted only where there is "urgency
in the matter"). See generally Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor
Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690 F.2d 1240, 1249 (9th Cir. 1982) (noting that the
purpose of a motion to reconsider is to provide "an efficient mechanism by
which a trial court judge can correct an otherwise erroneous judgment
without implicating the appellate process"); Thomas E. Baker & Denis J.
Hauptly, Taking Another Measure of the "Crisis of Volume" in the U.S. Courts
of Appeals, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 97, 97-98 (1994) (noting long delays in the
federal circuit courts).
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nuances of higher courts' jurisprudence on the hot controversies of
the day.187  It is an equally great thing that academics are
discussing, in larger and larger numbers, the body of statistical
data generated by huge numbers of decisions on general legal
subjects.'8 8  But these two approaches leave unexplored an
important type of legal scholarship: in-depth analysis of routine
types of judicial opinions in light of highly specific questions.
Such a methodology is crucial for two related reasons.
First, the day-to-day work of the courts affects millions of
people's lives in deep and expansive ways. Indeed, the more
routine the type of case, the more important the subject is to the
ordinary citizen. One can comb through literally thousands of
unpublished district court opinions on the causes of action that
make up the lion's share of the federal judiciary's workload-
habeas, Social Security, § 1983-without finding more than a
handful of decisions cited in a law review article. 8 9 Although it
stands to reason that there would be fewer such cites, given the
scale of the data, the non-precedential nature of the decisions,
their often cursory analysis, and so on-there is no reason for the
academy to neglect any kind of reasoned consideration of these
decisions altogether. Indeed, every such decision represented a
significant event in an individual's life, and each says something
about the state of the law and its relationship to litigants.
Scholars have a duty to address these cases.190
That lesson is particularly striking in the context of this
article, where every case involves one federal judge who believed
the Constitution compelled the release of a prisoner and another
federal judge who disagreed. These are not trivial matters. 191 it
187. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
189. See, e.g., supra note 3 and accompanying text.
190. Indeed, while there has been substantial criticism of circuit courts
for relying increasingly upon unpublished dispositions, see generally, e.g.,
Patrick J. Schiltz, The Citation of Unpublished Opinions in the Federal
Courts of Appeals, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 23 (2005), there has been little if any
recognition of one corollary problem: that an insufficient number of
commentators read and critique unpublished appellate decisions to keep the
courts of appeals honest.
191. Section 2254 has come under increasing attack in recent years as
unnecessary and burdensome. See generally, e.g., NANCY J. KING & JOSEPH L.
HOFFMANN, HABEAS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: USES, ABUSES, AND THE
FUTURE OF THE GREAT WRIT (2011). The conclusions of this article can be
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simply does not make sense that an unpublished district court
decision automatically warrants no scholarly analysis but as soon
as it is appealed and becomes a published circuit court decision it
deserves such analysis, regardless of the reasoning above or
below.
Second, close inspection of the day-to-day work of the courts
can yield broad lessons that go to the heart of our judicial system.
This article vividly illustrates the point. With an exceptionally
narrow question in mind, a detailed examination of a few dozen
unpublished district court opinions reveals something dramatic
about the very nature of what it means to be a judge and about
how we should structure the third branch of government. It is not
clear how else the lesson might have been derived, and legal
scholars should be sensitive to any methodology that sheds light
on previously neglected aspects of our legal system.
The issue under consideration here illustrates the utility of
the article's methodology. AEDPA has been a lightning rod for
harsh scholarly and judicial criticism. 192 Indeed, there have even
been probing critiques of the very specific power that is targeted
in this article. 193  But the criticism takes its lead from the
published, appellate jurisprudence,194 and thereby neglects the
understood to lay the groundwork for a response to such criticism, as they
suggest that there continue to be potentially meritorious petitions filed in
federal court and that those petitions should be treated with greater care
than they currently are. More to the point, the sample indicates that the
inefficiency of the federal habeas system may result as much, if not more,
from ill-advised procedures practiced by the courts themselves as it does from
the meritlessness of the petitions. This fact dovetails nicely with the other
obvious rebuttal to Professor King and her sympathists: that the increasing
restrictions on habeas relief imposed by Congress and the courts are in large
part responsible for the dwindling number of successful § 2254 claims, not
necessarily the improved quality of state habeas adjudication. See sources
cited supra notes 14 and 39.
192. See, e.g., Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997) ("All we can say
is that in a world of silk purses and pigs' ears, [AEDPA] is not a silk purse of
the art of statutory drafting."); John H. Blume, AEDPA: The "Hype" and the
"Bite", 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259, 288-92 (2006); Toby J. Heytens, Managing
Transitional Moments in Criminal Cases, 115 YALE L.J. 922, 992-93 (2006);
Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA's Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and Federalism, 82 TUL.
L. REV. 443, 448 (2007); Bryan A. Stevenson, The Politics of Fear and Death:
Successive Problems in Capital Habeas Corpus Cases, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 699,
771-76 (2002).
193. See sources cited supra note 26.
194. For instance, both Cutler and Hagglund focus largely on defective or
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more fundamental question implicated by COAs: can district
judges capably scrutinize their own decisions?1 95 As demonstrated
by the analysis above, the only way to properly answer that
important question is to sift through the unnoticed, unpublished
work that makes up the great mass of judicial decision-making.
This article does so here, and discovers a profound dysfunction at
the heart of the judicial system.
The article attempts a new type of legal scholarship that
offers great promise. No doubt others will resume where it leaves
off.
improvidently granted certificates. Some of this criticism seems to only
compound the confusion, as it assumes the same flawed premise upon which
Rule 11(a) is based. For example, Cutler appreciates the inefficiency of
allowing multiple levels of the judiciary to pass on certification, but expresses
support for the paradoxical view that a trial court is in a better position to
determine whether there should be appellate review than an appellate court.
Cutler, supra note 26, at 346-47 ("[A] district court's familiarity with the case
provides a solid basis for deciding the need for appellate review."). In fact,
Cutler proposes placing COAs solely in the hands of the circuit courts but
appears to do so, rather strangely, because he believes that there is a greater
problem with improvidently granted certificates than improperly denied ones.
Id. at 358-59. This article arrives at the same conclusion via the opposite
route.
195. Judge Friendly did not make the mistake of ignoring pragmatic
considerations when he considered the question at hand, though he
addressed only the narrow concern that circuit courts can more efficiently
resolve applications for COAs. Friendly, supra note 12, at 144 n.9. He did
not reflect on the most compelling support for this efficiency argument: that
district judges are largely incapable of properly ruling on COAs in the first
instance.
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TABLE I: CASES WHERE A DISTRICT JUDGE RULED ON A COA
AFTER A MAGISTRATE RECOMMENDED GRANTING § 2254 RELIEF AND
THE DISTRICT JUDGE DENIED ITI 96
Case Circuit District Case Name & COA
# Subsequent Granted or
History (if any) Denied by
District
Court?
I Second Western Letizia v. Walker Denied
District of Letizia v.






2 Third Eastern Rhodes v. Granted
District of Varano, No. 08-




3 Third Middle Benchoff v. Denied
District of Colleran, No.
Pennsylvania CIV A 303-CV-
740, 2005 WL
4708211 (M.D.
Pa. Feb. 2, 2005)
196. The cases are listed in numerical order of circuit, within that in
alphabetical order of state, within that in alphabetical order of district, and
within that in alphabetical order of the petitioner's name. Citations are to
the district court denials of habeas relief (which sometimes include the COA
ruling as well), not to the magistrate recommendations, which sometimes
have separate Westlaw citations. Subsequent case history for each case is
presented only in this table, not in the footnotes appended to the body of the
article, because the entire data sample is contained here. All citations were
updated on March 16, 2012. Subsequent case history is included where it
occurred within two years of that date and is available on Westlaw. Because
so many of the granted COAs were granted only in part, and because the
distinction is not relevant to the article's conclusions, all cases in which a
COA was granted on any issue are demarcated as "granted."
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4 Third Western Sargent v. Granted






5 Fourth Southern Mathers v. Denied









6 Fifth Eastern Higgins v. Cain, Granted





7 Fifth Western McCullough v. Denied
District of Cain, No. 05-








8 Fifth Northern Alonzo v. Thaler, Denied





9 Fifth Northern Gooden v. Denied







10 Fifth Northern Hayes v. Granted









11 Fifth Southern Salinas v. Denied





12 Fifth Southern Walbey v. Granted









13 Sixth Western Yenawine v. Granted









S. Ct. 91 (2011)









F. App'x 96 (6th
Cir. 2009)
15 Sixth Western Askew v. Granted






16 Sixth Western Elder v. Granted
District of Berghuis, 644 F.
Michigan Supp. 2d 888
(W.D. Mich.
2009)
17 Sixth Northern Bell v. Anderson, Granted
District of No. 1:05-CV-






18 Sixth Northern Brooks v. Denied






19 Sixth Northern Goldberg v. Denied
District of Maloney, No.



























21 Sixth Northern Lawwill v. Denied
District of Pineda, No. 1:08

















23 Sixth Northern Pordash v. Denied
District of Hudson, No.















24 Sixth Northern Quinn v. Ohio Denied
District of Dep't ofRehab.





25 Sixth Northern Smith v. Moore, Granted
District of No. 3:07CV-














27 Eighth Northern Tunstall v. Granted
District of Hopkins, 126 F.
Iowa Supp. 2d 1196
(N.D. Iowa
2000)
28 Eighth Eastern Matthews v. Granted











29 Ninth District of DeBerry v. Granted












30 Ninth Eastern Gregory v. Granted
District of Chavez, No. CV









31 Ninth Eastern Holley v. Granted









32 Ninth Eastern Johnson v. Finn, Granted
District of Nos. 2:03-CV-






























34 Ninth Eastern Saifullah v. Denied










35 Ninth Eastern Somers v. Granted









36 Ninth Eastern Thompson v. Granted





















38 Ninth Central Casarotti v. Granted









39 Ninth Central Davis v. Granted







40 Ninth Central Gzikowski v. Granted














41 Ninth Central Stallworth v. Denied"








42 Ninth Southern Armitage v. Denied






43 Ninth Southern Corona v. Granted














44 Ninth Southern Rosser v. Cate, Granted





197. But see supra note 140.
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46 Ninth Western Larson v. Glebe, Granted









47 Tenth Eastern Mitchell v. Granted
District of Jones, No. CIV-
Oklahoma 06-503-RAW,
2010 WL
1141358 (E.D.
Okla. Mar. 22,
2010), affd, 415
F. App'x 106
(10th Cir. 2011)
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